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COMMENTS
SYMPOSIUM ON OIL AND GAS UNITIZATION
THE NATURE OF UNITIZED TITLE
As cooperative development becomes increasingly widespread
the problems relating to unitized titles grow in importance. The term
"unitized title" is used as descriptive of the situation where parties other than the original wellsite owner share in production from
the wellsite under an arrangement for reciprocal sharing, either
actual or potential, from the production on their wellsites. The term
is intended to encompass the situation where such a reciprocal
sharing is compelled by an order of a state conservation body. A
unitized title may be established over a large area including perhaps
an entire field, or it may cover only a small area as the grouping
together of a large area is referred to as unitization while the
smaller project is termed pooling.'
A unitized title may be brought about by one of several means.
The state may have the power to compel the creation of a unitized
title. Voluntary methods include the community lease, the lease
pooling clause, and the separate unit agreement. The community
lease method is the execution of a single lease by all parties to
the unitized area, describing different tracts owned in severalty
by them.' The lease pooling clause gives the lessee the power to
commit the leased tract, or a part or parts thereof, to a unitized
area. The separate unit agreement is entered into by the parties
apart from the various leases on the tracts unitized. Certain problems are peculiar to the means of unitizing adopted. For instance,
in the case of the community lease, the intent to unitize is presumed as a matter of law in Texas, 8 while in Louisiana whether
or not the tracts are unitized is determined by ascertaining the
1 These definitions of "pooling" and "unitization" follow those of Mr. Hardwicke in
Unitization Statutes: Voluntary Action or Compulsion, 24 ROCKY MT. L. Ruv. 29, 30

(1951).

2 For the distinction between a community lease and a joint lease see Hardwicke
and Hardwicke, Apportionment of Royalty to Separate Tracts: The Entirety Clause and
the Community Lease, 32 Tzx. L. RFv. 660, 676 n. 39 (1954).
3 Parker v. Parker, 144 S.W. 2d 303. (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) error rel.
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actual intent of the parties. 4 But for the purposes of this subject
it is thought that the means of unitizing selected should not cause
divergent results. As will appear hereafter in the discussion of
problems raised by unitizing, the courts have failed to make any
distinction on the basis of the method of unitizing that was used.
EFFECT OF UNITIZING ON TITLES

Two views have been taken as to the effect of unitizing upon the
titles of the parties. The view hereinafter referred to as the cross
conveyance doctrine is that, by the act of unitizing, each party to
the unitized area conveys a real interest in his tract to each other
party in return for which there is a similar conveyance of interests
in their tracts to him.
The other view will be referred to as the contract theory. The
position taken by the advocates of this view is that the act of unitizing has no effect on the titles of the parties to the unitized area,
and that there is no conveyance of a real interest. The right of the
various parties to share in the production from the tracts of the
other parties is simply a contract right, derived from the agreement of the parties.
There is case authority supporting both views, with perhaps
the greater weight of authority supporting the doctrine of cross
conveyancing. It is thought to be preferable to present the authorities in the context of the particular problem under consideration
by the court.
PROBLEMS CREATED BY UNITIZING TITLE

Parties
Since the landmark case in the field of unitized titles arose
out of a controversy over the question of who were necessary
parties in a suit for title to land within a unitized area, that problem will be first discussed. The Texas case of Veal v. Thomason5
first laid down the doctrine of cross conveyancing. The actual
holding of the case was to the effect that all of the parties to a
community lease were necessary parties and had to be joined in
the suit before an action could be maintained for title and to free
4 Louisiana Canal Co. v. Heyd, 189 La. 903, 181 So. 439 (1938).

5 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W. 2d 472 (1942).
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the tract from the community lease. The rationale of the case was
that upon the execution of the community lease there resulted a
cross conveyance of a royalty interest on the part of each party
within the unitized area to each other party in the area. The court
stated that the result of the execution of the community lease was
"to vest all the lessors of land in this unitized block with joint
6
ownership of the royalty earned from all the land in such block."
The party problems raised by this decision have been extensively considered elsewhere. 7 A strict application of the rule of
this decision would result in closing the courts to litigants contesting title and to free the tract from the unitizing agreement when
the number of parties to the unitized area is great, as is commonly
the case. If however the question of necessary parties be considered as a policy question only, as has been suggested,' then the
solution of this difficulty seems possible even though the rationale
of the Veal case be accepted. The recent case of Douglas v.
Butcher9 indicates the trend of liberality in deciding party questions. The case seems indistinguishable from the Veal case except
on policy considerations. Suit had been dismissed in a partition
action in the trial court for failure to join 2300 parties. The
judgment of dismissal was reversed on appeal. In any case the
question of parties drops from consideration when the validity
of the unit is not contested.10
In the context of the party question Mr. Dedman in his article
quoted with approval the following statement from an article"
by Hammonds and Ray:
It is submitted, however, that in the great majority of pooling and
unitization agreements the parties thereto do not intend to effect cross

assignments of the historical titles to their mineral interests; and where
of grant in the agreement the courts should not
there are no words 12
hold that they have.
6 Id.

at 476.

7Dedman, Indispensable Parties in Pooling Cases, 9 Sw. L.J. 27 (1955) ; Masterson, Indispensable Partiesin Oil and Gas Litigation, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON OIL AND GAS
LAW AND TAXATION 139 (1955).
8 Masterson, supra note 7, at

149.
9272 S.W. 2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref., n.r.e.
10 Hudson v. Newell, 172 F. 2d 848. (5th Cir. 1949) ; Fussell v. Rinque, 269 S.W.
2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref., n.r.e.
11 Unitization of Oil and Gas Properties,31 Tax Mag. 199, 200, 1 (1953).
12 Dedman, supra note 7, at 86.

COMMENTS

The above statement is an example of the contract theory. It is
believed that the adoption of such a theory is not necessary to the
solution of the party question and that, as pointed out later, the
adoption of such a solution may possibly create problems of a
more serious nature.
The Rule Against Perpetuities
If the exercise of the power to unitize constitutes the conveyance
of a real interest and such conveyance may take place beyond
the period of the Rule then this power violates the Rule. The
objection that this power, which might be provided for in either
a lease, pooling clause or in a separate unit agreement, constitutes a violation of the Rule has been raised to date in two leading cases. The first was the Kansas case of Kenoyer v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co.'" The Kansas court decided that the Rule "simply
has no application" to the lease pooling clause. The principal
policy behind the Rule appears to be to prevent restrictions on the
alienability of land. 4 There can be little doubt but that unitizing,
particularly in an area where the limits of the field are not yet
defined, adds to the value of the tracts unitized and thus promotes
alienability. It is not thought that the power of the lessee to unitize
at some date in the future in any way restricts the free alienability
of land. The courts have been quick to prevent any inequitable
exercise of the power to unitize.15 The policy of the state to prevent
the waste of natural resources and to promote greater ultimate
recovery would seem to be a policy equally strong as that of the
Rule. Certainly the right to unitize in the future is a valuable one
and does promote the more efficient use of mineral resources.
The second case is Phillips Petroleum Company v. Peterson,6
perhaps the leading case supporting the contract theory. The
court considers the cross conveyance doctrine and expressly rejects
it. This rejection of the doctrine is relegated to the status of dicta,
however, by the later language of the court. It was said:
13 173 Kan. 183, 245 P. 2d 176 (1952).
14 The policy behind the Rule is extensively discussed in Meyers, The Effect of the
Rule Against Perpetuities on Perpetual Non-ParticipatingRoyalty and Kindred Interests, 32 TEx. L. REzv. 369, 415-425 (1954).
15 Imes v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 184 Okla. 79, 84 P. 2d 1106 (1938).
16 218 F. 2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
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Finally, there being no time fixed within which unitization was to
be effected, it must be implied that the parties intended it to take place
within a reasonable time, and a reasonable time, under the facts and
circumstances, would be well within the limitation of the rule against
perpetuities. Hence, had there been cross-assignments,
the rule against
17
perpetuities would not have been violated.

Did the court intend to limit this reasoning to the "facts and circumstances" presented in the Phillips case? It should be noted
that the court gave some weight to expressions of intent that there
be no cross conveyance. It might be, therefore, that the decision in
the Phillips case will be limited to the situation where there is an
expressed intent that no cross conveyance take place. The court
had previously used strong language, saying:
Section 12 [the unitization clause of the lease] does not violate the
rule against perpetuities, unless the unitization or pooling agreement
accomplishes transfers of interests in real property, or, otherwise
stated, effects cross-transfers of property interests among the parties
to the agreement. (Emphasis added.)

Aside from the question of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the
validity of the lease pooling clause seems well established.'8
It is thought to be highly questionable, however, that parties to
a unitized area might by expression of their intent not to cross
convey, prevent the application of the doctrine in a jurisdiction
which otherwise accepts the doctrine. The contrary view is taken
by Mr. Hoffman in his leading work wherein he states that
"[t] here can hardly be any objection in the law to such an express
agreement that the pooling or unitization shall not constitute an
exchange or transfer of property interests."' 9 The grounds of disagreement with Mr. Hoffman's view are set out in the next subdivision. Even if the parties are not able to escape the application of the doctrine of cross conveyancing by contract it seems
certain that the application of the rule to invalidate the lease pooling clause may be prevented by express stipulation in the clause
that the power to pool shall not be exercised beyond the period
Id. at 931.
IsCases recognizing either expressly or impliedly the validity of the clause have
17

been collected in

HOFFMAN, VOLUNTARY POOLING AND UNITIZATION

(hereinafter referred to as Hoffman).
19 Hoffman 168.

98 n. 82 (1954)
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of the rule. Such a form has been suggested.2" This form eliminates
the question of whether or not the rule of the Phillips case, that
pooling must occur within a reasonable time not beyond the period
of the rule, applies only when there is an expression of intent by
the parties that there be no cross conveyance.
The contract theory has been proposed as a way to avoid the
perpetuities problem presented by the cross conveyancing doctrine. Mr. Hoffman suggests that ".... the lease pooling clause
can best be dealt with, both by lessors and lessees and by the
courts, as an ordinary contract provision which provides for a
changed manner of operation under the circumstances prescribed
in the clause and a changed manner of calculating the royalties
under the new operation."2 1 (Emphasis added.) But this particular
solution is not thought to be necessary. Indeed if the contract right
be in the nature of a real covenant to share proportionately in
the production then it might not be efficacious, since the Rule
could apply equally to this sort of covenant.2 2 Even if there is no
express provision in the pooling clause limiting the exercise of
the power to a period within the rule, the validity of the clause
might still be upheld on the reasoning that the power must be
exercised within a reasonable time not beyond the period of the
Rule. This is of course the holding in the Phillips case without any
modification to conform to the facts and circumstances of that case.
The Kenoyer case has been cited as rejecting the cross conveyance
doctrine." But the solution of that case, that the Rule does not
have application to this situation, would seem sound and applicable even though the doctrine be accepted.
The Statute of Frauds
It is believed that the greatest difficulty presented by the contract
theory is that it would present the danger of making an interest
in land personalty if the contract right is not considered to be
in the nature of a real covenant. Thus unitized interests would be
taken outside the protection of the various formalities required
20

Walker, Recent developments in Pooling and Unitization, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON

OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 47, 52 (1955).

Hoffman 99.
Meyers, supra note 14, at 410 n. 127.
23 Hoffman 164; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F. 2d 926, 931 n. 7 (10th
Cir. 1954).
21

22
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for a conveyance of an interest in land and notice thereof. Perhaps from the practical viewpoint the danger is more imagined
than real since to date only one case has been found dealing with
parol unitizing."' On the other hand if there are no particular advantages to be gained from the adoption of the contract theory
then little reason appears to convert, or attempt to convert, what
has to date been considered a real interest into personalty.
The theory of the Veal case was that the act of unitizing constituted a cross conveyance of royalty interests among the parties to
the unitized area. Royalty may be defined as the right to share
in production without the right to lease, develop, or receive delay
rentals and bonuses. The rights of the parties after unitizing seem
clearly to be the equivalent of royalty. In only a very few jurisdictions is there any question but that royalty is an interest in
land.25 Whether the interest be realty or personalty the question
of parties may remain in any case, the question there being
whether or not the interests of the other parties to the unitized area
will be irreparably harmed by a judgment in a suit to which they
were not parties.
An Oklahoma case has allowed parol pooling although a royalty interest is considered a real interest in that jurisdiction."
This case is however probably best explained by an apparent failure to raise the point of violation of the Statute of Frauds. If the
rights of the parties to the unitized area in the tracts committed
to the area are considered as contractual only then there is a
danger that the rights of the parties will be treated as personalty,
since contract rights are not usually real rights. A covenant running with the land is in the form of a contract, and yet it must be
created by writing. 27 However, it is thought that the better view
is that a running covenant is an interest in land. This subject is
discussed hereafter." But if a running covenant is considered an
24 Griswold v. Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 205 Okla. 412, 238 P. 2d 322
(1952).
25 Cases on the nature of a royalty interest are collected in 3 SuMMEaS, OIL AND GAS
§§ 572-85 (Perm. ed. 1938). It appears that only in Kansas, Tegarden v. Beers, 175
Kan. 610, 265 P. 2d 845 (1954), and Pennsylvania, Miller v. Dierken, 153 Pa. Super.
389, 33 A. 2d 804,807 (1943), is royalty still considered personalty. A few jurisdic.
tions have not squarely decided the question.
26 Griswold v. Public Service Company of Oklahoma, 205 Okla. 412, 238 P. 2d 322
(1952).
27 See note 68 infra.
28 See text infra beginning at note 65.
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interest in land then there is seemingly no purpose at all in making a distinction between a cross conveyance and the acquisition
of a contractual right. This is because the party acquiring the
benefit of the covenant to share production on the agreed basis
would acquire an interest in land. To say, then, that there has not
been a cross conveyance of an interest in land is merely to seek a
new title for the process that has heretofore been called "conveying". Each party to the unit area will have an interest in land
that he did not possess before. It is believed therefore that if the
contract theory has any rational basis it is that the interest acquired
by the parties to the unitized area is personalty only and thus outside the protection of the traditional safeguards placed around
the creation and transfer of real rights. The statement of the
Texas court in Sheffield v. Hogg,29 in considering the nature of
a royalty interest, is apposite to this question. The court there
said:
The oil industry in Texas is largely dependent for development,
growth, or prosperity, on the doctrine that the interests we are considering-such as the lessee's and the lessor's estates under contracts
which are in customary use in Texas-are interests in land; and hence
not subject to parol sale ... o
These interests are commonly very valuable and should not be
subject to the controversy that would undoubtedly follow their
creation by parol.
The cases that have apparently adopted the contract theory do
not seem to have considered this ramification. In Louisiana the
point was raised recently " under the following circumstances.
The cross conveyance doctrine was proposed as the basis for computing royalty to a lessor in a unit established by the Commissioner of Conservation on the basis of the average price obtained
by all the lessees on production from the unit. The court held
that the unit was established as a conservation measure only and
that the Commissioner had no power to interfere with the contractual rights of the parties with respect to the royalty due and the
proper method of computing and paying it. The decision seems
29124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W. 2d 1021 (1934).
so Id. at 1024.
31 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Production Co., 221 La. 608.

60 So. 2d 9 (1952).
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correct on the basis of either theory, but has been cited as sustaining the contract theory. 2 Assuming that the lessor obtained
an interest in the holdings of each other party to the unit yet the
right of the lessor to compensation for the production should be
subject to the contractual relation with the lessee as regards payment for that share. The West Virginia court indicated acceptance
of the contract theory in the case of Boggess v. Milam,"3 the court
stating that:
In our opinion, the so-called unitization agreement does not effect
a merger of title.... It consolidates only the contractualinterests under
the leases to the United Fuel Gas Company. 4 (Emphasis added.)
This view is in accord with the earlier West Virginia case of
Lynch v. Davis. 5
Assuming that the ordinary effect of unitizing is to effect a
cross conveyance of real interests the question arises of whether
or not the parties may by express stipulation in the unitizing agreement prevent such a result. The court in the Phillips case gave
some weight to such a stipulation by the parties. It seems very
questionable that the parties may validly so stipulate. A closely
analogous question would be whether by stipulation a royalty
other than a pooled interest may be made personalty. There is
some authority to the effect that it may.
In Dashko v. Friedman 36 suit was brought for an overriding
royalty as compensation for securing a lease. The court stated
that " . . . if terms of the contract so dealt with the minerals
only, after they were produced, then the contract would not be
prohibited by the statute of frauds." There is a later case " where
a royalty on sand and gravel was orally agreed upon as consideration for the services of an agent in giving information concerning tracts which contained commercial deposits of sand and
gravel. Recovery was allowed on the basis of the Dashko case.
The mere fact that there is an agency situation is not distinguishing since "[a]n agreement of agency to sell land is within the
32 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F. 2d 926, 931 (1954) ; Hoffman 160.
83127 W. Va. 654, 34 S.E. 2d 267 (1945).
34 Id. at 270.
35 79 W. Va. 437, 92 S.E. 427 (1917).
36 59 S.W. 2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
3 Waco-Tex Materials Co. v. Lee, 210 S.W. 2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error
rel., n.r.e.
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statute of frauds if by the terms of the agreement the agent is
to receive land or an interest in land." 38
It is certain at least that if it is possible to write around the
doctrine of cross conveyancing by providing that the sharing in
production from the various unitized tracts should be only in
severed minerals then the language used must clearly express
this intent. That this is so is illustrated by the case of Tennant v.
Dunn.39 The contention was made there that recordation of a conveyance of an oil payment in the nature of an overriding royalty
did not give constructive notice. It was held that there was a conveyance of an interest in land. But the court expressly noted that
it did not decide what the nature of the interest would have been
"had the assignment provided for payment to her out of the proceeds of the oil, or a part of the value of the oil, rather than for
delivery of the oil." Reference is made back to the statement
of the Texas court in Sheffield v. Hogg as a strong expression of
what is believed to be much the more desirable view, that these
interests should be considered as interests in land, and this should
be so regardless of stipulations by the parties.
Thus far attention has been paid the nature of the interest of
the lessors within the unitized area. There is no logical reason
why the doctrine of cross conveyancing should not apply also to
the interest of the lessee. However on this point the Texas case of
Knight v. Chicago Corporation40 should be considered. It might
be taken as holding that there is no cross conveyance of the interest
of the lessee. Probably however the decision should be limited to
the particular facts of that case. In the later case of Leach v.
Brown 41 the Texas court apparently considers "lease owners" to
be within the rule of the Veal case so that the doctrine would
also apply to the lessee. Concerning this question Mr. Hoffman
states that "[i f the doctrine [of cross conveyancing] is well
founded in its application, in so far as royalty is concerned,
there can be no logical basis for distinguishing working interests."4 2 Apparently however the former method used by the
as 151 A.L.R. 648, 661 (1944).
39 130 Tex. 285, 110 S.W. 2d 53 (1937). This case is discussed in Walker, Oil
Payments, 20 TE:x. L. REv. 841, 844-47 (1942).
40 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W. 2d 564 (1945).
41251 S.W. 2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.
42 Hoffman 156.
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lessees in committing their interests to the unitized area, the exchange assignments of interests, has fallen into disuse. 8 The
unitization agreement in the Phillips case expressly provided that
there be no transfer of title."'
The Pennsylvania case of Coolbaugh v. Lehigh & Wilkes-Barre
Coal Co." adopts the view that even without an express stipulation, the pooling is of the minerals (in that case coal) after
severance. The court stated that:
Dana never had any title whatsoever to lot 29, or the coal under it.
What he had was an interest in the royalties in 28 and 29 after they
had become due by the mining of the coal.
Texas and California seem committed to the view that unitizing results in a cross conveyance of a real interest on the part of
each party to the unitized area." Since the holdings of the Texas
courts have not been notably consistent in the application of the
doctrine when various ramifications have been presented, e.g.
Knight v. Chicago Corporation " and Sohio v. Jurek,"' it is of
interest to note the recent affirmation of the doctrine by the
Supreme Court of Texas in the recent case of Renwar Oil Corporation v. Lancaster" where the court held that " . . . these [unitization] agreements are essentially a conveyance in realty... ",
citing the Veal case. A compendium of cases applying the doctrine of cross conveyancing has been collected elsewhere. 0 To that
collection it is thought that the Mississippi case of Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital National Bank 51 should be added as having
adopted the doctrine because of the view hereinafter taken of the
nature of a running covenant in this situation, that being the
43 "The practice of executing cross assignments is not now general. Most, if not
all, of the agreements that I have seen during the last three or four years declare that
there is no intention to convey title, but only to provide for development and for allocations of production and the costs of operation." Hardwicke, supra note 1, at 30. The
two methods of committing the interests of the lessees, by cross assignment or contractual stipulation, are discussed in Voorhees, Techniques of Field-wide Unitization, 24
RocKY MT. L. REv. 14,22 (1951).
44218 F. 2d 926, 930 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1954).
45218 Pa. 320, 67 A. 615 (1907).
46 Veal v. Thomason, 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W. 2d 472 (1942) ; Tanner v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P. 2d 383 (1942).
47 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W. 2d 564 (1945).
48248 S.W. 2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
49
--------Tex -------------276 S.W. 2d 774 (1955).

5o Hoffman 144-61.

51 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
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apparent basis of decision in that case. Some confusion might
arise in regard to the doctrine of cross conveyancing from the
fact that all of the parties to the unitized area do not receive
delay rentals and bonuses from all of the leases after the unitizing
has occurred. Since the interest acquired by the parties to the
unitized area are royalty interests only they acquire no right to
delay rentals or bonuses, which are incidents of a mineral interest.
The fact that these incidents are not received does not therefore
indicate that the cross conveyance of interests occurs later than
the execution of the unitizing agreement. In the case of a lease
pooling clause or similar provision in a unit or community agreement the cross conveyance obviously cannot occur until the unitizing is accomplished. When unitizing is accomplished by means of
a lease pooling clause it may be that the relation between the
lessor and the lessee is one of principal and agent." The question
then occurs whether such power, since it amounts to a conveyance
at the time of unitizing, may be validly exercised after the death
of the principal. To meet this objection it has been proposed,"
and judicially accepted in the Phillips case, 5 that the power be
regarded as one coupled with an interest so that the power to
unitize is not extinguished upon the death of the principal, the
lessor.
Acquisition of Unitized Interests
The conclusion simply that unitizing results in the conveyance
of an interest in land does not solve the problems which arise in
the acquisition of unitized interests. The nature of the right
acquired must be more fully investigated.
If the holding of the Veal case be accepted, that there is a
cross conveyance of a royalty interest in each tract, then except
for the few jurisdictions where a royalty interest is still considered
personalty " there is a conveyance of a real interest effected at
the time of unitizing. The exact nature of that real interest is of
52 See the discussion in Shank, Some Legal Problems Presented by the PoolingPro.
visions of the Modern Oil and Gas Leases, 23 TEx. L. REv. 150, 156-58 (1945) ; Hard.
wicke, Problems Arising Out of Royalty Clauses in Oil and Gas Leases in Texas, 29
Tax. L. Rav. 790, 812-13 (1951).
53 Hardwicke, supra note 52, at 812-13.
54 218 F. 2d 926, 933 (10th Cir. 1954).
55 See note 25 supra.
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some importance. But beyond conceding that royalty is an interest
in land there has been little judicial discussion concerning its
precise nature. Indeed there has not often been occasion for
detailed analysis. Perhaps the most generally accepted view is
that royalty is, or is at least closely analogous to, the common law
interest of rent.5" There has been able argument that royalty is
the precise common law interest of rent.67
The question of the exact nature of the interest becomes important when a unitized interest is acquired, whether by voluntary
or involuntary conveyance. Under the cross conveyance doctrine
each lessor keeps a proportionate interest in his tract and conveys
all the rest, receiving a conveyance of interests in the other tracts
in return. Assume that after unitizing the lessee will pay a royalty
of 1/8 to the lessors of two tracts which are to share equally in
production from either tract. Thus each lessor will be entitled
to 1/16 royalty. The state of the title after unitizing is that each
lessor owns a 1/32 royalty in his own tract and a 1/32 royalty
in the tract of the other lessor. The point is whether a purchaser
of either of these tracts acquires only the lessor's 1/32 interest
in the tract purchased or whether he acquires the entire interest
of the lessor in the unitized area, in this case a 1/16. The question may be framed as whether the entire interest of the lessor
in the unitized area is appurtenant to the tract contributed by
him, so as to pass unmentioned with the tract, or whether it is
held in gross so that it must be expressly mentioned to pass. The
question may of course be eliminated by express language in the
instrument of conveyance clearly showing the intent of the parties.
The California courts hold that the cross conveyed interests of
the lessor in the tracts other than his own must be specifically
conveyed or levied upon. In Tanner v. Title Insurance and Trust
Co.5" the court stated that:
The royalty interest thus transferred by each landowner to his
colessors is an incorporeal hereditament in gross ... and the grantee's
interest in the oil produced upon the property of one of the colessors
56 Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 7 TEx. L. REv. 1, 40-46 (1928) ; Blake, Oil Royalties: A Suggested Criterion,

13 Miss. L.J. 307 (1940).
5 Blake, supra note 56.
5s 20 Cal. 2d 814, 129 P. 2d 383 (1942).
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is entirely separate and distinct from the royalty interest retained by
him in oil which might be produced from his own premises.5 9 (Emphasis added.)
The Mississippi court in Merrill Engineering Co. v. Capital
National Bank 60 reached a contrary result. The court proceeded
to its conclusion apparently on the theory that there was a running

covenant to share royalty payments on the agreed basis burdening
each tract. The benefit of these covenants was held appurtenant to
each tract so that it passed with a conveyance of the tract though
unmentioned. There is no discussion in the case of the elements
of a valid running covenant, 6' but this analysis seems clearly
supported by the language of the opinion.
Mr. Hoffman takes the view that the agreement by all of the
parties to a unitized area to share royalties from production on
their respective tracts should be considered a running covenant.
However it is his view that such an interpretation precludes the
cross conveyance doctrine for he states that:
It is well to note that had the Texas court chosen to regard the effect
of pooling as a sharing of production and operations, without a crossconveyance of property interests, problems relating to the matter of
parties to suits involving unit tracts might also be avoided. Under the
suggested analysis the lessor in each tract would retain all of the legal
royalty interest in the tract but his agreement in the pooling arrangement to share with others the production from that tract as well as
the production from the other tracts comprising the unit would be
regarded as a covenant appurtenant to his royalty interest and running
62
with the land.

It is not believed that such an analysis necessarily precludes the
cross conveyance doctrine.
The analysis of the unitizing agreement as a running covenant
to share production on the agreed basis is useful in resolving the
problems presented by the acquisition of a unitized interest.
Support for such an analysis is readily found in the view that has
5 Id. at 386.

60 192 Miss. 378, 5 So. 2d 666 (1942).
The essentials of a real covenant are technical and there is considerable disagreement among the scholars in the field. The requisites of a valid running covenant are
set out in Chapter IV of CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH THE LAND." (2d ed. 1947). Judge Clark in the appendices to his book expresses
sharp disagreement with some of the views embodied in the Restatement.
61

62 Hoffman 161.
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been taken as to the nature of an entirety provision. When royalty
interests under a lease are owned in severalty and production
is obtained, those royalty owners not owning an interest in the
tract from which production was obtained do not share. This is
the doctrine of non-apportionment as laid down by the leading
case of Japhet v. McRae, 8 The entirety clause was drawn to meet
this situation. It provides that all royalty owners are to share
in production wherever obtained on the leased premises in the
proportion that the acreage owned by each separate royalty
owner bears to the entire lease acreage. There is a close analogy
between the operation of the entirety provision on the interests
of royalty owners holding in severalty under a single lease and
the operation of a unitizing agreement between owners of separate
tracts. The doctrine of non-apportionment prevents sharing by the
royalty owners though oil is being drained out from under the
tract wherein they own an interest just as the law of capture
operates on production from separate tracts. An entirety clause
has been specifically held to be a covenant running with the land. 4
Considering the unitizing agreement, whatever form it may take,
as a running covenant eliminates the objection to the sufficiency
of the agreement as a conveyance due to the absence of words
of grant. And yet it is believed that the situation is the same as if
a cross conveyance had occurred. It has been stated that "...
a
covenant running with the land is treated as a contract and not a
property interest in a court of law... " 6 But the distinctions
between the various incorporeal interests in land, as easements,
servitudes and running covenants, are largely historical 66 and the
same interest in substance may be considered as any one of these
interests, depending upon the particular manner of its creation.
Thus a right essentially amounting to an easement, traditionally
considered an interest in land, may be created as a running cove63 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925).
64 "... What he did, in fact, was in the nature of a covenant which burden[ed]
his remainder to the extent that one purchasing subsequent to said lease contract and
subject to it acquired an interest in the royalty on the whole acreage prorated as the
fraction thereof purchased bore to the entire tract. . ." (Emphasis added). Gypsy Oil
Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 P. 864,868 (1924). Messrs. Hardwicke reach a
similar conclusion in their article, supra note 2, at 672-73.
65 2 AM. LAw OF PROP. 364 (1952).
68 Clark, op. cit supra note 61, at 5. It is there said, after giving an example, that
"[ilt is clear, therefore, that the various interests overlap each other, and that the
distinctions between them often break down."

COMMENTS

nant. It seems clear therefore that running covenants may amount
to an interest in land. Since those parties entitled to the benefit
of the covenant to share production on the agreed basis hold a
right in the nature of a royalty interest it would seem clear that
the right founded on this particular covenant is an interest in
land. As has been noted a royalty interest is almost universally
considered as a real interest. 67 It should be noted, however, that
even if the parties entitled to the benefit of the covenant are not
considered to hold interests in the land of the covenantor, yet
the covenant must be in writing."8 The view of the Restatement
regarding the creation of an interest in land by a running covenant is that:
A promise that certain land will be used in a specific way is one
which either
creates, or may easily be thought to create, an interest
69
in land.
A running covenant is frequently referred to as a "right in the
land of another." 70 Thus though the unitizing agreement be considered a running covenant, the situation after the making of the
agreement is that each party to the unitized area has acquired
an interest in the lands of the other parties. As aforesaid, to deny
that this real interest was acquired by a cross conveyance is simply
to use another term for the process that has heretofore been called
a "conveyance". It is believed therefore that the analysis of the
unitizing agreement as a running covenant is completely consistent with the doctrine of cross conveyancing.
The analysis in terms of a running covenant may be brought
to bear on the problem of just what passes unmentioned with a
conveyance of a tract within a unitized area. The question, it will
be recalled, is whether only the interest of the lessor which he
retains in his particular tract passes or whether his entire interest
in the unitized area passes.
The sole reason for the necessity of entering into a plan of
cooperative development is the law of capture, the rule that the
party first reducing the minerals to possession has title even
though part of the minerals recovered may have been drained
67 See note 25 supra.

6s 2 AM.

LAW OF PROP. 364 (1952) ; 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
69 5 RSTATEMENT, PROPERTY, INTRODUCTORY NOTE §§ 522-523.

70 Clark, op. cit. supra note 61, at 2n. 5.

§ 522 (1944).
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from the land of another. The result of the application of the
law of capture was the drilling of many more wells than was
necessary to efficiently recover the mineral reserves, entailing
considerable waste of capital and mineral resources. It should
be clear therefore that the plan is entered into to benefit the
mineral estates of the parties. In covenant terminology the respective rights and obligations under a unitization plan "touch
and concern" the mineral estate. When the common law principles of appurtenancy are thus injected it appears that the only
reasonable conclusion is to hold that the entire interest in the unit
is appurtenant to the tract contributed. And when the benefit of
sharing is no longer possible in regard to a particular tract because
of a surrender of a tract or because of failure of title of one of
the parties to the suit, it would seem that the burden to share
should no longer be enforced against the tracts remaining within
the unitized area in the absence of express provision.
7
However the California court in Clark v. Elsinore Oil Co. 1
allowed the owners of the surrendered tracts to continue to share
though there was no express provision to this effect in the community lease there involved. In the subsequent case of Tanner v.
Olds 72 it was further held that the owner of the surrendered tract
might continue to share even though he drained the unitized
area by wells on his surrendered tract. When there was a title
failure, however, the California court in Gillis v. Royalty Service
Corporation7' refused to allow either the former owner or the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale to share because of failure of
consideration and failure to defend title as required by the lease.
But aside from the covenant analysis and considering the unitized interest acquired as strictly a royalty interest it would seem
that the correct view is that the interest of the conveying lessor
throughout the entire unitized area should pass with a conveyance
of his tract. As indicated earlier the generally accepted view is
that royalty is closely analogous to the common law interest of
rent. Rent passes with the reversion unless there is an express
stipulation to the contrary.7 4
71138 Cal. App. 6, 31 P. 2d 476 (1934).
72 29 Cal. 2d 110, 173 P. 2d 6 (1946).
73 91 Cal. App. 2d 365, 204 P. 2d 968 (1949).
74 This is the analysis made by Walker in Developments in the Law of Oil and Gas
in Texas During the War Years, 25 Tux. L. REv. 1, 14 (1946).
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It is submitted that if the analogy of the unitized interest to
either a running covenant or rent is pressed too far then undesirable results follow. For example, to the extent that royalty is
considered analogous to rent service, free assignability is retained. But only the lessor's royalty is analogous to rent service,
there being a reversion necessary to this interest.7" Royalty granted
by the lessor, overriding royalty reserved by the lessee upon
assignment of the lease and overriding royalty granted by the
lessee would be analogous to rent charge, distinguished from
rent service by the lack of a reversion. Rent charge is freely
assignable but "[i]t has been held . . . not subject to division,
and that an attempt to subdivide it results in its extinguishment." 76
Clearly this result would not be desirable.
On the other hand the technical requirements of privity "7essential to a real covenant and the restrictions upon the assignability
of a covenant held in gross, would not seem a welcome addition to
the present situation.
The courts however have wisely recognized the inapplicability
of the common law interests to the comparatively recently developed mineral interests. An example of this judicial attitude
is to be found in Callahan v. Martin " where the California court
said that " . . . our classification of property as realty or personalty is based on common law definitions which crystallized
in a time when oil interests were not the subject of judicial cognizance." A similar attitude was evinced by the Texas court in
Sheffield v. Hogg79 where after an extended discussion the court
failed to fit a royalty interest into any common law niche but
concluded simply that "[c]lassify them as you may, they are at
least rights or privileges appertaining to real property... "
To the extent however that either analogy contributes to just
and desirable results it is believed that utilization of the analogy
is desirable and not inconsonant with present rationalizations
about the nature of unitized title.
75 Blake, The Oil and Gas Lease, 13 So. CAL.
76 Clark, op. cit. supra note 61, at 192.
77See note 61 supra.
78

L.

3 Cal. 2d 110, 43 P. 2d 788, 791 (1935).

79 124 Tex. 290, 77 S.W. 2d 1021, 1030 (1934).

REv. 393, 415-22 (1940).
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to present the various
problems which arise in connection with unitized titles. More
specifically it has been intended to demonstrate that the solution
to these problems is not reached simply by rejecting the doctrine of
cross conveyancing. It is hoped that a successful attempt has been
made to present solutions within the framework of the doctrine.
In any case the adoption of a theory that only contract rights are
acquired by the parties to the unitized area does not seem necessary or desirable, assuming that the courts presently following the
cross conveyance doctrine could be induced to change. The problem of necessary parties would still remain, the question being
whether the interests of a party would be irreparably harmed by
a judgment in a suit to which he was not a party. If the contractual right is considered a real right in the nature of a running
covenant then the Rule Against Perpetuities might still be applicable. The Rule might apply even if the contractual right were personalty only since the Rule applies to personal property as well as
to real property. It is thought that considering the unitized right as
personalty would violate well considered and long established
policies of the courts that rights of this nature should be subject
to the formalities incident to dealings in realty. If the right be
considered as a running covenant then there is a whole body of
technical principles that enter the picture to plague the modern
lawyer. But even if these technicalities were to be ignored by the
courts, as well they might, then it would seem that a running
covenant of this nature should be an interest in land. If it is an
interest in land then the cross conveyance doctrine is upheld
since after unitizing each party to the unitized area has received
a real interest in the tracts of the other parties. However, even if
it should be held that this running covenant is not a real interest
then it would still be necessary to create it by writing. In any
case analogy to the principles of real covenants is useful in resolving problems arising upon the acquisition of unitized interests.
W. D. Masterson, III.

